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We develop a large customer-level database to study electricity pricing to U.S. manufacturing plants
from 1963 to 2000.  We document tremendous dispersion in price per kWh, trace that dispersion to
quantity discounts and spatial differentials, estimate the role of cost factors in quantity discounts, and
test whether marginal price schedules conform to marginal cost and Ramsey pricing conditions.  Our
cost analysis and pricing tests rely on a novel empirical approach that exploits utility-level differences
in the customer size distribution to estimate how supply costs vary with purchase quantity.
The results reveal that annual supply costs per kWh fall by more than half in moving from smaller
to bigger purchasers, providing a clear cost-based rationale for quantity discounts.  Before the mid
1970s, marginal price and marginal cost schedules are nearly identical, in line with efficient pricing.
In later years, marginal supply costs exceed marginal prices for smaller manufacturing customers by
10% or more. In contrast to a clear role for cost factors, our evidence provides no support for a standard
Ramsey-pricing interpretation of quantity discounts.  Spatial dispersion in retail electricity prices among
states, counties and utility service territories is large and rises over time for smaller purchasers.
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1.  Introduction  
Longstanding concerns and recent developments have combined to intensify 
interest in the performance of the U.S. electric power industry. These include persistent 
regional disparities in retail prices, growth in wholesale power markets, a wave of 
restructuring and deregulation initiatives in the 1990s, difficulties in the transition to a 
more competitive electricity sector, and, perhaps most spectacularly, the California 
electricity crisis of 2000-2001.
1 Despite these concerns and developments, we lack broad 
empirical studies of electricity prices paid by end users, and there are major gaps in our 
knowledge of retail pricing patterns and their evolution over time. These gaps hamper 
efforts to place recent developments in historical perspective, to evaluate the impact of 
regulatory changes on electricity users, and to assess theories of public utility pricing. 
To help address these issues, we construct a rich micro database – Prices and 
Quantities of Electricity in Manufacturing (PQEM) – and use it to study electricity 
pricing to U.S. manufacturing plants from 1963 to 2000. The PQEM includes data on 
electricity expenditures, purchases (watt-hours) and other variables for more than 48,000 
manufacturing plants per year, linked to additional data on the utilities that supply 
electricity. Our customer-level data are limited to manufacturers, but they are informative 
about pricing practices for a broader class that includes other industrial customers and 
large and mid-size commercial customers.
2  
                                                 
1 Hirsh (1999), EIA (2000), Besanko et al. (2001), Borenstein (2002), and Joskow (2005), among others, 
describe and analyze these matters. Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) anticipate many of the pitfalls and 
challenges that have confronted reform efforts in the electricity sector. 
2 We inspected electricity tariffs for several utilities and found that they offered the same menu of 
electricity pricing terms to manufacturers, other industrial customers, and large and mid-size commercial 
customers. In addition, average electricity prices for the manufacturing sector behave similarly to average 
prices for the industrial sector as a whole, as we show below.  Industrial purchasers account for 45% of 
retail electricity sales (watt-hours) in 1963 and 31% in 2000 (EIA, 2003a, Table 8.5).  In turn, 
manufacturing plants account for the lion’s share of electricity purchases by the industrial sector.    2
Figure 1 displays several measures of dispersion in the distribution of log 
electricity prices from 1963 to 2000.
3 The price measure is the ratio of the plant’s annual 
expenditures on purchased electricity to its annual purchases (watt-hours). The figure 
shows purchase-weighted and shipments-weighted price distributions, where the former 
weights each plant-level observation by watt-hours of electricity purchases, and the latter 
weights by output as measured by shipments.
4 As seen in Figure 1, there is tremendous 
dispersion in the electricity prices paid by manufacturing plants. The purchase-weighted 
standard deviation exceeds 38% in all years and reaches 55% in some years. By way of 
comparison, the hours-weighted standard deviation of log hourly production worker 
wages among manufacturing plants in the PQEM ranges from 39% to 43% between 1975 
and 1993.
5 In other words, the dispersion in electricity prices among manufacturing 
plants is at least as great as the dispersion in their average hourly wages.  
Figure 1 also reveals that the log price distribution underwent a great compression 
from 1967 to the late 1970s.
6 The between-plant standard deviation fell from 55% in 
1967 to 44% in 1979 on a purchase-weighted basis and from 47% to 35% on a 
shipments-weighted basis. Over the same time frame, the 90-10 price differential shrank 
by about 37 log points under both weighting methods. The 90-10 differential later 
                                                 
3 The natural log transformation is convenient for characterizing the magnitude of price differences and 
price dispersion. In addition, electricity transmission over power lines and the process of transforming 
voltage levels involve costs in the form of electrical energy dissipated as heat energy. The dissipation of 
electrical energy rises with transmission distance, other things equal, so that spatial price differentials are 
aptly described in log terms. For these reasons, we often consider log price differentials in this paper, but 
we also consider prices measured in natural units. 
4 These weighting methods mirror the use of input-weighted and output-weighted distributions in studies 
that quantify between-plant and within-plant components of productivity growth. Examples include Foster 
et al. (2001) and van Biesebroeck (2004).  
5 The PQEM lacks clean measures of hourly wages before 1975 or after 1993. See Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1991) for a detailed study of between-plant wage dispersion in the U.S. manufacturing sector. 
6 The temporary widening of dispersion in the mid 1970s reflects the 1973-74 oil price shock and 
differences among state public utility commissions in how rapidly they moved to approve higher electricity 
tariffs. In later years, automatic fuel price adjustment clauses came into widespread use in tariff schedules.   3
widened but never returned to the peaks of the 1960s. To the best of our knowledge, we 
are the first to quantify the remarkable extent of electricity price dispersion for a major 
end-user group and the first to document the great compression that played out by the late 
1970s. 
We show below that the great compression episode reflects a sharp erosion of 
quantity discounts. On a purchase-weighted basis, the average elasticity of price with 
respect to a plant’s annual purchase quantity shrank from -22% in 1967 to about -9% in 
the late 1970s, partially recovering after the mid 1980s. Because the range of electricity 
purchases among manufacturers is enormous, these elasticities translate into very large 
price differentials. For example, prices for the biggest purchasers were two-thirds below 
the median price in the 1960s. Plant-level differences in purchase amounts account for 
75% of overall price dispersion among manufacturers in 1963 but only 30% by 1978.  
Quantity discounts in the form of declining-block tariffs are a well-known feature 
of retail electricity pricing for industrial and commercial customers and a sometimes 
contentious topic in ratemaking proceedings and legislative hearings.
7 They are also the 
object of careful analysis in theoretical treatments of nonlinear pricing (e.g., Wilson, 
1993) and public utility pricing in particular (e.g., Brown and Sibley, 1986). Insofar as 
the cost of supplying electric power declines with a customer’s purchase quantity, an 
efficient two-part tariff or other marginal-cost pricing scheme requires quantity discounts. 
If demand is also more elastic at higher purchase levels, Ramsey pricing by a revenue-
                                                 
7 Cudahy and Malko (1976) discuss quantity discounts and other aspects of rate design from the perspective 
of public utility regulators in a prominent case involving the Madison Gas & Electric Company. Hirsh 
(1999) recounts the political struggles over federal legislative efforts to reform rate-making practices, 
efforts that culminated in the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978, a major 
component of President Carter’s National Energy Plan.     4
constrained public utility entails lower markups for bigger customers and, hence, is 
another potential explanation for quantity discounts.    
These cost and demand determinants of quantity discounts are well understood as 
a matter of theory, but their importance in practice is unclear. Brown and Sibley (1986) 
and Borenstein and Holland (2003), for example, argue that the approach to rate setting 
by electric utilities and their regulators, and the resulting tariff schedules, do not seem 
well designed to achieve efficient pricing.  Moreover, previous research offers no 
quantitative, theoretically grounded explanation for the sharp erosion in quantity 
discounts. To address these matters, we propose and implement a novel method for 
estimating the contribution of cost factors and price markups to quantity discounts. In 
particular, we exploit the considerable variation across electric utilities in the size 
distribution of customer purchases to estimate how supply costs per watt-hour vary with 
customer purchase quantities. The results reveal that supply costs fall by more than half 
in moving from smaller to bigger purchasers. This pattern holds throughout the past four 
decades, providing a clear cost-based rationale for quantity discounts.  
We use the estimated price and supply cost schedules to construct marginal prices 
and marginal costs with respect to customer purchase quantity. Comparing the marginal 
schedules, we find no support for the Ramsey-pricing view that quantity discounts reflect 
smaller markups for more elastic demanders. However, the evidence is highly consistent 
with marginal cost pricing in the early years of our sample.  Indeed, marginal price 
schedules are nearly identical to marginal cost schedules before the mid 1970s. In the 
upper half of the customer purchase distribution, they are nearly identical from 1967 to 
2000. Among smaller manufacturing customers, however, the pricing structure begins to   5
deviate from efficiency after 1973. From 1981 onwards, marginal supply costs for 
smaller manufacturing customers exceed marginal prices by 10% or more. 
We also consider the dispersion in average electricity prices among states, 
counties and utility service territories. We show that spatial price differentials are large, 
and that they display three interesting and somewhat surprising time-series patterns. First, 
in the lower deciles of the purchases distribution, spatial price dispersion widened over 
time. Second, and in glaring contrast, spatial price dispersion in the top deciles of the 
purchases distribution fell sharply from the 1960s to the late 1980s. Third, in the 1990s – 
when wholesale power markets grew rapidly – spatial price dispersion at the retail level 
did not diminish and even rose modestly over much of the purchases distribution.  
The next section describes the PQEM database. Section 3 quantifies the 
dispersion of electricity prices between and within industries, states, counties, utilities, 
and purchase size classes. Section 4 discusses cost and demand influences on electricity 
pricing, describes key features of electricity tariffs, and develops evidence on electricity 
price-quantity schedules. Section 5 considers behavioral responses by customers that 
contribute to a negative relationship between electricity price and purchase quantity. 
Section 6 estimates supply costs as a function of customer purchase levels, then applies 
the supply schedules to evaluate whether cost factors can explain quantity discounts and 
their evolution over time. Section 7 investigates whether marginal price schedules 
comport with efficient pricing and Ramsey pricing.  Section 8 summarizes our main 
findings and identifies directions for future research. 
  
   6
2.  The PQEM Database 
The PQEM database derives principally from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual 
Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and various files produced by the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). We draw our data on electricity prices and quantities and other 
variables for individual manufacturing plants from ASM micro files for 1963, 1967, and 
1972-2000. The ASM is a series of nationally representative, five-year panels refreshed 
by births as a panel ages. Large manufacturing plants with at least 250 employees are 
sampled with certainty, and smaller plants with at least 5 employees are sampled 
randomly with probabilities that increase with the number of employees.
8 ASM plants 
account for about one-sixth of all manufacturing plants and about three-quarters of 
manufacturing employment. Our statistics make use of ASM sample weights, so that our 
results are nationally representative. 
ASM plants report expenditures for purchased electricity during the calendar year 
and annual purchases (kWh). As mentioned above, we calculate the plant-level price as 
expenditures on purchased electricity divided by quantity purchased. The ASM also 
contains county and state codes that help to assign manufacturing plants to electricity 
suppliers. As described in a companion paper (Davis et al., 2007b), we identified and 
resolved several issues with ASM electricity price and quantity measures in the course of 
preparing this study.  We also cross-checked the ASM data against the Manufacturing 
Energy Consumption Survey, another plant-level data source at the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census that relies on a different survey. 
                                                 
8 The number of employees required to be a certainty case is lower in 1963 and 1967. In 1963, all plants in 
a multi-plant firm with 100 or more employees were sampled with certainty. The same was true in 1967 
except for plants in apparel (SIC 23) and printing and publishing (SIC 27), which had certainty thresholds 
of 250 employees.   7
We merged ASM plants to their electricity suppliers using a variety of sources, 
The Annual Electric Utility Reports, also known as the EIA-861 files, include each 
utility’s revenue from sales to industrial customers (by state) and a list of the counties in 
which the utility has industrial customers. The EIA-861 files provide an immediate match 
to the utility for plants in counties served by a single utility. For many states, we are able 
to supplement the EIA-861 files with Geographic Information System (GIS) maps, a list 
of zip codes served by each utility or printed maps showing utility service territories.  
These supplemental sources of information enable us to construct accurate matches for 
counties served by more than one utility. We have some form of supplemental 
information for 18 states, accounting for 49% of electricity purchases and 54% of 
manufacturing shipments.  For plants in states without this supplemental information, we 
created a “best match” utility indicator using the method described in Appendix A.  
We also exploit publicly available information on the identity of those plants that 
purchase electricity directly from the six largest public power authorities.
9 Direct 
purchasers from public power authorities typically consume large quantities of electricity, 
and they often accept high-voltage power, operate their own transformers, and obtain 
electric power at heavily discounted rates. While few in number, these direct purchasers 
account for a large fraction of electricity purchases in some counties, and they constitute 
a distinct segment of the retail electricity market. We identified between 56 and 93 direct 
purchasers from public power authorities per year.  
                                                 
9 They are the Tennessee Valley Authority, Bonneville Power Administration, Santee Cooper, New York 
Power Authority, Grand River Dam Authority, and Colorado River Commission of Nevada. Fourteen 
public power authorities supplied electricity directly to industrial customers in 2000, but the six largest 
accounted for nearly 98% of the revenues from direct sales to industrial customers (EIA-861 file).   8
Finally, we incorporated the State Energy Data 2000 files into the PQEM.
10 These 
files include annual data on fuel sources used for electricity generation by state from 
1960 to 2000. We construct annual state-level fuel shares in electric power generation for 
the following five categories:  coal, petroleum and natural gas, hydropower, nuclear 
power, and other (includes geothermal, wind, wood and waste, photovoltaic, and solar).  
Table 1 reports selected characteristics of the PQEM. The database contains more 
than 1.8 million plant-level observations over the period from 1963 to 2000. There are 
3,031 counties with manufacturing plants and 697 utilities, counting multi-state utilities 
once for each state in which they sell to industrial customers. The table shows that 
electricity purchases and cost shares vary enormously across manufacturing plants. For 
example, the 90
th quantile of the purchases distribution is 381 times the 10
th quantile on a 
shipments-weighted basis and 739 times on a purchase-weighted basis. The median ratio 
of electricity costs to labor costs is 4.7% on a shipments-weighted basis and 17.2% on a 
purchase-weighted basis. While electricity costs are a modest percentage of labor costs 
for most plants, the top quartile (decile) of purchasers have labor costs that exceed 62% 
(201%) of labor costs. In other words, a large fraction of electricity is purchased by plants 
for which electric power is a primary or major cost of production. 
3.  Electricity Price Dispersion 
After trending down for nearly a century, real electricity prices began to rise after 
1973.  They continued to rise for about ten years, before resuming the historical pattern 
of steady declines.  See Figure 2, which shows that these broad trends held for all major 
                                                 
10 This data is from the State Energy Data System (SEDS) on the Energy Information Administration 
Internet site, http://www.eia.doe.gov.   9
end-user groups.
11  We discuss the market, technological, regulatory and other factors 
behind these broad trends in an earlier working paper version of this study (Davis et al., 
2007a).  Here, we focus on price dispersion among manufacturing customers.   
To decompose the variance of log electricity prices into within-group and 
between-group components (industry, region, etc.), write the overall variance as 
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where pe is the log price of electricity for plant e,  e s is the weight for plant e,  p  is the 





=∑ is the sum of weights for plants in group g, 
W
g V   is the weighted variance within 
group g, and 
B V
 is the between-group variance. Table 2 reports the shipments-weighted 
version of (1) and its components for selected years, with se set to the product of the 
plant’s ASM sample weight and its shipments value. Table 3 reports analogous purchase-
weighted statistics.  
According to Table 2, the shipments-weighted standard deviation of log 
electricity prices across manufacturing plants stood at 47% in 1967, fell sharply to 37% 
by 1977, and then changed little over the next 23 years. Price dispersion also fell sharply 
                                                 
11 The electricity price series in Figure 2 for the residential, commercial and industrial sectors are from the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the two series for the manufacturing sector are constructed 
from the PQEM. The EIA data rely on reports from electric utilities, and the PQEM data rely on reports 
from electricity customers (manufacturing plants). EIA prices are calculated as revenue from retail 
electricity sales divided by kilowatt hours delivered to retail customers. Real prices are calculated using the 
BEA implicit price deflator for GDP (1996 = 100). In the EIA data, the industrial sector encompasses 
manufacturing, mining, construction and agriculture.    10
on a purchase-weighted basis (Table 3), from 55% in 1967 to 43% in 1977 and then 
further in the 1990s to stand at 38% in 2000.  Following a similar path, the between-
industry dispersion of electricity prices fell rapidly through 1982 and to even lower levels 
in the 1990s on a purchase-weighted basis. All told, the purchase-weighted dispersion of 
industry prices fell by almost half over the past four decades.  
Tables 2 and 3 also document several other facts.  First, spatial price differentials 
are large. County effects, for example, never account for less than 65% of the overall 
price variance on a purchase-weighted basis. Second, customer groups defined by 
electricity purchase quantities also account for a high percentage of overall price 
dispersion, especially in the 1960s.
12 Price dispersion among purchase-level groups fell 
by nearly half during our sample period, mostly between 1967 and 1977. Third, purchase 
level and utility jointly account for a high percentage of price dispersion throughout the 
past four decades. Groups defined by utility crossed with purchase deciles account for 71-
90% of the overall purchase-weighted basis price variance.  
Spatial price dispersion declined sharply over time on a purchase-weighted basis 
but rose on a shipments-weighted basis. Focusing on counties, the purchase-weighted 
standard deviation fell by nearly one-third from 1963 to 2000, while the analogous 
shipments-weighted measure rose by one-fifth. Closer examination of the data reveals 
that spatial price dispersion fell dramatically in the top decile of the purchases 
distribution (more heavily weighted in Table 3), but it rose in the bottom five deciles 
(more heavily weighted in Table 2). We highlight this pattern in Figure 3, which shows 
the evolution of spatial price dispersion for three selected deciles. To control for purchase 
                                                 
12 We group plants by where they fit into the distribution of electricity purchases in the indicated year, 
allowing the decile and centile boundaries to vary over time.   11
quantity differences within deciles, we construct Figure 3 using residuals from annual 
customer-level regressions of log price on a polynomial in log purchases.  As seen in 
Figure 3, there is an enormous decline from the late 1960 to the late 1980s in spatial price 
dispersion within Decile 10 (comprising the biggest purchasers). A similar, but more 
muted, pattern holds for Decile 9. The middle deciles exhibit little trend change in spatial 
price dispersion, as illustrated by Decile 6.  The lower deciles exhibit trend increases in 
spatial dispersion, as illustrated by Decile 1. Another noteworthy pattern highlighted by 
Figure 3 is the lack of a downward trend in spatial price dispersion during the 1990s, 
when wholesale power markets grew rapidly.  Sales of electricity for resale rose from 
41% of generated power in 1991 to 61% in 2000 (EIA, 2003b, Tables ES and 6.2).   
We summarize the empirical findings to this point in three statements. One, there 
is tremendous dispersion among manufacturing plants in price per kWh of electricity. 
Two, the plant-level distribution of electricity prices underwent a great compression 
through the late 1970s. Three, readily observed plant characteristics such as utility and 
customer purchase quantity capture most of the cross-sectional variation in electricity 
prices. The rest of the paper more fully explores the role of utility characteristics and 
purchase quantity in electricity pricing and supply costs. 
4.  Electricity Price-Quantity Schedules 
4.1 Cost and Demand Influences on Electricity Pricing     
Supply costs per kWh of electricity tend to be lower for larger industrial and 
commercial customers for several reasons. Large purchasers are more likely to locate 
near generating facilities to minimize transmission losses. High-voltage transmission 
lines can lead all the way to the customer’s doorstep, further reducing transmission costs.   12
A large power user is also more likely to operate equipment at high voltage levels, 
circumventing or reducing the need for step-down transformers and complex distribution 
networks. Large power users may operate and maintain their own step-down transformers 
as well, relieving the utility of this task and associated costs. Larger electricity customers 
also have stronger incentives to respond to pricing structures that discourage volatile 
consumption patterns and peak-period consumption. In turn, these incentive responses 
economize on generating and transmission facilities and mute the effect of system-wide 
demand fluctuations on marginal generating costs. Similarly, larger customers have 
stronger incentives to consider provisions for interruptible and curtailable power as a 
means of lowering electricity costs. These customer supply characteristics provide a cost 
basis for quantity discounts in electricity pricing. 
Customer demand characteristics also lead to quantity discounts under plausible 
conditions. Consider a utility that prices electricity to maximize consumer surplus subject 
to the constraint that its revenues equal its costs. As shown by Goldman et al. (1984), 
Brown and Sibley (1986) and Wilson (1993), among others, the optimal nonlinear pricing 
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where  () q M is the marginal price for the customer’s qth unit of electricity,  () Q q C ; is the 
marginal cost of the qth unit when the utility’s total quantity supplied is Q,  () [] q q M , η  is 
the elasticity of demand for the qth unit with respect to the marginal price, and the 
Ramsey number  [] 1 , 0 ∈ α  is chosen to satisfy the revenue constraint. Note that   13
0 = α corresponds to marginal cost pricing, and  1 = α  corresponds to the standard inverse 
elasticity rule for a profit-maximizing multi-product monopolist.
13 
  According to the Ramsey pricing condition (2), the markup of price over marginal 
cost declines with the purchase level provided that demand becomes more price elastic 
for successive units. Under this condition, Ramsey pricing leads to quantity discounts 
even when marginal costs are invariant with respect to purchase amount. If marginal 
costs also decline with purchases, then Ramsey pricing implies that the marginal price 
schedule declines more steeply than the marginal cost schedule.  We test this implication 
below.  We also test the efficient pricing condition,  ( ) ( ; ) for all  . M qC q Q q =   
4.2 Electricity Tariffs for Industrial Customers 
Electricity tariffs for industrial customers usually include separate energy and 
“demand” charges.
14 The energy charge depends on total kilowatt-hours of consumption 
during the billing period, and the demand charge depends on the highest consumption 
over 15- or 30-minute intervals within the billing period or longer time period. Roughly 
speaking, the demand charge reflects the customer’s maximal requirements for power. By 
discouraging uneven and erratic patterns of power consumption, the separate demand 
charge economizes on the need for generating, transmission and transformer facilities. 
Eligibility for the most favorable tariff schedules is usually limited to large customers 
                                                 
13 The revenue constraint does not preclude marginal cost pricing, even for a utility with declining costs 
over the relevant range. For example, consider a two-part tariff with a fixed access fee for each customer 
and marginal price set to marginal cost. Set the access fees so that total revenues cover total costs. Then, 
provided that the access fees are not so high as to deter participation by any consumer who values (some) 
electricity at more than its marginal cost, this type of two-part tariff is fully efficient (Brown and Sibley, 
1986). In this case, α = 0 and the Ramsey-pricing condition (2) reduces to a form of marginal cost pricing. 
When efficient pricing is infeasible, the Ramsey pricing rule (2) minimizes the allocative distortions 
induced by pricing above marginal cost.  
14 See Cowern (2001) for a concise introduction to electricity tariffs for industrial customers. Caywood 
(1972) provides a detailed description of electricity tariffs and rate-setting practices.   14
who make long term commitments to minimum contract demand levels that place a high 
floor on monthly charges.   
Traditionally, electric utilities have offered declining-block rate schedules, 
whereby the marginal price per kWh of energy and the marginal price per kW of demand 
decline as step functions (Caywood, 1972). For bigger purchasers, in particular, 
electricity tariffs also depend on other factors such as voltage level and willingness to 
accept power interruptions or curtailments. Differential rates by time of day and other 
applications of peak-load pricing principles came into wider use after the mid 1970s 
(ELR, 1975, and Cudahy and Malko, 1976). Moves toward more finely differentiated 
tariff schedules for industrial customers continued through at least the late 1980s 
(Wilson, 1993, pages 36-38). The California Electricity Crisis of 2000-2001 intensified 
interest in retail pricing structures (Borenstein and Holland, 2003).  
As an illustration of current and past practice, Table 4 summarizes the menu of 
electricity tariff schedules offered to industrial customers by Santee Cooper Power.
15 The 
tariffs contain three main charges: a monthly customer charge, monthly demand charges, 
and monthly energy charges. Larger customers face smaller energy charges per kWh and 
smaller demand charges per kW but higher monthly minimum charges. For example, the 
Medium General Service schedule offers an energy charge of 2.6¢ per kWh, a demand 
charge of $11.85 per kW, and a minimum monthly payment of $29. The Large Power and 
Light schedule offers a lower energy charge of 2.19¢ per kWh and a lower demand 
                                                 
15 Santee Cooper is also known as the South Carolina Public Service Authority. Among utilities with 
positive industrial revenue, Santee Cooper is close to average size with industrial sales of $238 million in 
2000. The Santee Cooper schedules reflected in Table 4 are in effect as of July 2004 and date back to 1996. 
They are available for download at http://www.santeecooper.com/.    15
charge of $10.76 per kW, but a much higher minimum monthly payment of $11,960.
16 
Large Santee Cooper customers who locate near transmission lines and provide their own 
transformers receive discounts of roughly 4% on demand charges. Optional riders to the 
Large Power and Light schedule offer big discounts on demand charges for off-peak 
power and power subject to curtailment or interruption. The Large Power and Light 
schedule and its optional riders require a five-year customer commitment to a contract 
demand level of at least 1,000 kW and the implied demand charges. These basic features 
of the Santee Cooper tariff schedules are similar to the tariff menu offered to industrial 
customers by Pacific Gas & Electric in 1988, as described in Wilson (1993), and to the 
illustrative tariff schedule for industrial customers reported by Caywood in the 1956 and 
1972 editions of Electric Utility Rate Economics.  
Recall that the PQEM contains the average price per kWh paid by a plant during 
the calendar year, so it does not capture the full complexity of the underlying electricity 
tariff schedules. In this respect, the PQEM is analogous to household and establishment-
level data sets that report workers’ average hourly or annual wages but not the details of 
the underlying compensation arrangements. To be sure, the lack of data on the underlying 
tariff schedules (or compensation terms) is a limitation, but it does not preclude an 
informative analysis. Despite the complexity of real-world compensation arrangements, 
there is a vast body of informative research on wage structure and labor demand that 
fruitfully exploits simple data on wage rates for individual workers and employers. Our 
empirical analysis of the retail pricing structure for electricity proceeds in the same spirit. 
 
                                                 
16 This monthly minimum holds for a customer who contracts for at least 1,000 kW of firm power. Lower 
minimum charges are available to customers who accept interruptible or curtailable power.   16
4.3 Empirical Price-Quantity Schedules 
We now present evidence on empirical price-quantity schedules for electricity, 
and changes in these schedules over time. When a plant operates for only part of the 
calendar year, the PQEM measure of annual kWh does not accurately indicate where the 
plant fits into the purchases distribution. For this reason, we henceforth exclude part-year 
observations.
17 We also exclude observations that display extreme seasonality or 
variation in production activity within the year, because customers with highly variable 
loads typically face special tariff schedules with higher charges.
18   
Figure 4 shows the mean log real price of electricity by purchase decile from 1963 
to 2000.  The purchase deciles are almost perfectly rank ordered by price during the past 
four decades. Price differentials peak in 1967, when the gap in mean price between the 
top and bottom deciles exceeds 100 log points. Purchase-level price differentials shrink 
dramatically from 1967 through the first half of the 1970s, and they continue to shrink 
through the end of the decade. The gap between mean prices in the top and bottom 
deciles of the purchase distribution remains large throughout the past four decades, 
amounting to about 50 log points in 2000.   
Figure 5 presents a more detailed empirical price-quantity schedule for selected 
years. It shows the fit from plant-level regressions of log price on a fifth-order 
polynomial in the log of annual purchases.
19 We run the regressions separately by year, 
                                                 
17 We define part-year observations as those for which the number of production workers in any single 
quarter is less than 5 percent of the annual average number of production workers.  These part-year 
observations represent less than 2 percent of shipments and electricity purchases in each year.  
18 For example, Santee Cooper tariff schedule TP for temporary service (e.g., ballpark lighting) specifies a 
flat rate of 7.23¢ per kWh. Schedule GV for Seasonal General Service specifies energy charges of 2.34¢ 
per kWh and demand charges of $14.35 per kW. 
19 We also considered nonparametric regression fits for the price-quantity schedule using the SAS GAM 
procedure (spline option, 100 degrees of freedom). Except at the extreme upper end of the purchase 
distribution, accounting for less than one percent of shipments, the nonparametric fits are highly similar to   17
weighting each observation by its shipments value and ASM sample weight. The 
regression fits show a dramatic flattening of the price-quantity schedule between 1967 
and 1978. According to Figure 5, the price differential between the 25
th and 75
th quantiles 
of the purchase distribution shrinks from 46 log points in 1967 to 26 log points in 1978, 
and the gap between the 5
th and 95
th purchase quantiles shrinks from 103 to 51 log 
points.
20 In short, there was a remarkable erosion of quantity discounts between 1967 and 
the late 1970s. We turn next to potential explanations for these strikingly large quantity 
discounts and their evolution over time.  
5.  Behavioral Responses by Customers as a Source of Quantity Discounts 
5.1 Spatial Sorting of Production Activity 
If bigger purchasers locate in areas with cheaper electricity, the pooled data will 
show a negative relationship between price and purchase level even if all utilities offer 
flat price-quantity schedules. More generally, any tendency by bigger purchasers to buy 
from utilities with cheaper electricity contributes to a negative price-quantity relationship. 
This type of spatial sorting potentially explains much of the pricing structure seen in 
Figures 4 and 5. To evaluate this explanation, we fit two plant-level regressions of log 
price on a fifth-order polynomial in log purchases for each year. One regression 
specification includes utility fixed effects to control for the identity of the plant’s 
electricity supplier, and the other specification omits utility effects. We then use the fitted 
regressions to calculate the average elasticity of electricity price with respect to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the fifth-order polynomial fits. Given this similarity and the much longer run times for the nonparametric 
fits, especially when we add covariates, we focus on polynomial fits throughout the paper.   
20 We also created analogs to Figure 5 for the five utilities with the largest number of customer-level 
observations (several hundred per year). All five utilities show the same basic pattern as in Figure 5.    18
customers’ annual purchase levels. To isolate the role of spatial sorting, we compare the 
elasticity values calculated from regressions with and without utility fixed effects.  
Figure 6 shows the results. It confirms a dramatic flattening of price-quantity 
schedules through the late 1970s, and it conveniently summarizes the magnitude of 
quantity discounts. In the 1960s, the average price-quantity elasticity is -22% on a 
purchase-weighted basis, and it ranges from -12% to -14% on a shipments-weighted 
basis. Bigger values for purchase-weighted elasticities reflect the steeper slopes of the 
price-quantity schedules at the upper end of the purchase distribution (Figure 5).  
The inclusion of utility fixed effects has only a modest impact on the elasticity 
values prior to 1974. That is, in the early part of our sample period the huge purchase-
level price differentials in Figures 4 and 5 reflect within-utility price variation, not spatial 
sorting of manufacturing customers. Spatial sorting plays a bigger role after 1973, 
especially on a purchase-weighted basis.  Evidently, the onset of rising real electricity 
prices in 1973 (Figure 2) encouraged the migration of electricity-intensive manufacturing 
activity to areas served by utilities with cheaper electricity. The bigger role for spatial 
sorting on a purchase-weighted basis suggests that bigger purchasers are more sensitive 
to spatial price differences in their choice of location. 
5.2 Other Behavioral Responses to Electricity Tariffs 
In addition to location choice, several other behavioral responses by customers 
influence the empirical price-quantity schedule. Bigger purchasers have greater 
opportunity and incentive to reduce price per kWh by managing load factors (ratio of 
average to peak demand), taking high-voltage power, responding to peak-load pricing 
incentives, and accepting curtailable or interruptible power. To help assess the   19
importance of these behaviors for the observed quantity discounts, we compare the 
empirical price-quantity schedule in the PQEM data to the schedule for “firm” power 
implied by the Santee Cooper tariff summarized in Table 4. In calculating the implied 
price-quantity schedule for firm power, we fix the load factor at 50% and exclude 
discounts for off-peak or high-voltage power.
21 These assumptions serve to foreclose 
quantity discounts that arise from behavioral responses to pricing incentives, isolating a 
mechanical customer size effect. In contrast, the empirical price-quantity schedule 
reflects the mechanical size effect and the behavioral responses by electricity customers. 
Figure 7 plots the implied Santee Cooper price-quantity schedule and the within-
utility price-quantity schedule in the 2000 PQEM data. (We do not have enough customer 
observations to estimate an empirical price-quantity schedule for Santee Cooper alone.)  
As in Figure 5, the fitted empirical schedule is based on a fifth-order polynomial 
specification, but we now include utility fixed effects in the plant-level regression to 
isolate within-utility price variation.   
Figure 7 delivers three results. First, the Santee Cooper and empirical schedules 
are both rather flat in the lower quartile of the purchase distribution, except at the extreme 
bottom end. Second, over the middle part of the distribution that roughly spans the 
interquartile range of purchases by manufacturing customers, the price per kWh declines 
with annual purchase quantity by 30 to 40 log points. Over this range, quantity discounts 
are essentially “built into” the tariff schedule according to the evidence in Figure 7.
22  
                                                 
21 Mechanically, we compute the lower envelope of the price-quantity schedules implied by the General 
Service, Medium General Service, Large General Service, and Large Power and Light schedules. Recall 
that the tariff schedules described in Table 4 do not include taxes or adjustments specified by the Fuel 
Adjustment Clause and the Demand Sales Adjustment Clause.   
22 The implied schedule declines more rapidly than the empirical schedule over this range, which indicates 
that the Santee Cooper tariff menu involves bigger “built in” quantity discounts than the average utility.    20
Third, the large quantity discounts in the upper quartile of the distribution reflect 
behavioral responses to pricing incentives. “Built in” quantity discounts do not underlie 
the negative price-quantity relationship in this segment of the purchase distribution. 
Instead, the story is one of customer responses to pricing incentives. 
5.3 Summary 
This section establishes that the negative price-quantity relation evident in Figures 
4 and 5 reflects a combination of customer responses to pricing incentives and 
mechanical discounts built into electricity tariff schedules. Both aspects are important, 
but they are relevant for different segments of the purchase distribution. Mechanical 
discounts are important in the middle of the distribution, and behavioral responses to 
pricing incentives are important in the upper quartile. Both the responses to pricing 
incentives reflected in Figure 7 and the spatial sorting response documented in Figure 6 
are concentrated among larger purchasers. This evidence reinforces the view – often 
expressed in the public utility and Ramsey-pricing literatures – that demand is more price 
elastic at higher purchase levels.     
6.  Customer Purchase Quantity and Electricity Supply Costs 
6.1 A Method for Estimating Supply Costs as a Function of Purchase Amount  
  We now develop a method for estimating supply costs as a function of customer 
purchase amount.  The method exploits the cross-sectional richness of the PQEM and, to 
the best of our knowledge, offers a novel approach to estimating customer-level supply 
cost schedules. The method involves three main steps. Step one uses customer-level data 
on purchase quantities to calculate utility-level statistics for the location and shape of the 
purchase distribution. Step two exploits the utility’s revenue constraint, which states that   21
average cost per kWh equals average price per kWh. Step three exploits cross-utility 
variation in the purchase distribution to estimate how costs per kWh of delivered 
electricity vary with customers’ annual purchases. We carry out step three using 
regression methods to control for other factors that affect supply costs. We now develop 
the method in detail. 
A portion of a utility’s costs are common to all customers, and the remaining 
portion can be allocated to particular customers. Let  g θ  be the common cost per kWh at 
utility g.  Write the allocable portion of costs per kWh for customer e that purchases  e q  
as  () , g ee Cq k + where the first term captures cost differences that vary systematically by 
purchase level and the second term captures idiosyncratic supply cost differences 
unrelated to purchase level. By construction,  0, ee sk = ∑ where  e s  is the share of 
purchases from utility g by plant e. Thus, letting TC denote total cost, we can write the 
average cost per kWh at utility g as 
()
g
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  The revenue constraint implies that a utility’s average cost per kWh equals its 
average price per kWh. Imposing this requirement in (3) yields  
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P
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where Pg is the purchase-weighted mean price per kWh at utility g, and 
P
g v  is an error 
term introduced by sampling variation in Pg. We do not directly observe the utility’s 
average price per kWh in the PQEM, but we can estimate it using price and quantity 
observations on the utility’s manufacturing customers.    22
To obtain an estimable specification from (4), we adopt three assumptions. First, 
we postulate that the  () q Cg  functions are the same for all g up to an additive term; i.e., 
() () g g q C q C α + = . Second, we approximate  ( ) q C as a polynomial in log (q). Third, we 
model the sum of the utility’s additive and common cost components as a linear function 
of observable utility characteristics X; namely,  g g g g u b X + = +θ α  Applying these 
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∈ ∑  is the nth 
uncentered sample moment of the log purchase distribution at g, and the  's γ  are the key 
parameters of interest for the supply cost schedule. The error component 
q
g v  arises from 
sampling variation in the moments of the purchase distribution, and  g ξ  arises from the 
polynomial approximation to C. Though not our main focus, the b parameters are also 
interesting, because they provide estimates of how average costs vary with utility 
characteristics when we control for the size distribution of customer purchases. 
  We estimate (5) by weighted ordinary least squares (WLS) and instrumental 
variables (IV) regression. We then use the γ  estimates to trace out the supply cost 
schedule as a function of customer purchase quantity. Before turning to the results, three 
econometric issues require some discussion.  
First, consider the error term  g u in (5) that arises from unobserved determinants of 
the additive and common costs. If these unobserved cost determinants vary systematically 
with the size distribution of customer purchases, they give rise to an omitted variables   23
problem that biases the estimates of  . γ  As a case in point, municipal and cooperatively 
owned utilities tend to serve smaller manufacturing customers.
23 If these same utilities 
also have lower supply costs conditional on customer size, then the regression (5) 
understates the extent to which costs per kWh decline with purchase amount, unless we 
control for utility type.  Hence, we include the utility’s organizational form in the X 
vector, distinguishing among cooperative and municipal utilities, state and federal power 
authorities, and private investor-owned utilities. For similar reasons, we include controls 
for the size of the utility and for the shares of electric power generated from hydro, 
nuclear, coal, and petroleum and natural gas. A potential omitted variables problem also 
arises in connection with non-sampling components of the error term 
P
g v  in (4) and (5). In 
particular, the revenue constraint might fail for manufacturing customers as a group 
because of cross-subsidization between classes of customers within the utility. To control 
for this possibility, we include in the X vector the fraction of the utility’s revenues 
derived from sales to industrial customers. 
  Second, the error term 
q
g v  that arises from sampling variation in the moments of 
the purchase distribution creates a standard errors-in-variables problem. To address this 
potential source of bias, we exploit the fact that consecutive ASM panels are 
independently drawn from the universe of manufacturing plants. It follows that the 
sampling error in the purchase distribution statistics for utility g at time t is uncorrelated 
with the sampling error at tk + , provided that a new ASM panel has commenced 
between t and  . tk +  Thus, we instrument the moments of the utility’s log (q) distribution 
                                                 
23 Davis et al. (2007) display the distribution of mean log purchases by manufacturing customers for private 
investor owned utilities and the analogous distribution for municipal and cooperatively owned utilities. A   24
with the corresponding statistics for the same utility calculated from a nearby year that 
draws on a different ASM sample.
24 
  Third, the number of annual customer-level observations per utility in the PQEM 
ranges widely from a small handful to hundreds. Hence, the sampling error components 
in (5) have a heteroscedastic structure. To improve the efficiency of our estimates, we 
weight each observation in the regression (5) by the square root of the number of 
manufacturing plants used to calculate the utility-level quantities. As a side benefit, this 
weighting method mitigates the errors-in-variable problem under least squares. 
6.2 Supply Cost Schedule Estimation Results 
Table 5 reports the WLS regressions of the form (5) on the utility-level data. We 
approximate the supply cost schedule ( ) q C  as a third-order polynomial in log (q). We 
normalize the purchase-weighted mean price per kWh to 100 in each year, so that slope 
coefficients on the indicator variables reflect percentage differences from the omitted 
category. We report results for selected years to economize on space, but our discussion 
below draws on results for all years. 
Municipal and cooperative utilities have lower estimated supply costs in the 
1960s and early 1970s, after controlling for other factors, and the cost advantage over 
private investor-owned utilities re-emerges in the 1990s. Relative to coal-powered 
electricity generation, greater reliance on nuclear power yields higher supply costs; hydro 
power yields lower supply costs until the 1990s; and petroleum and natural gas yield 
higher supply costs after the 1970s. The estimated effects of power source are sizable. 
                                                                                                                                                 
comparison of these distributions confirms that average customer size tends to be considerably smaller at 
municipal and cooperatively owned utilities.  
24 For k=1, we can construct instruments across ASM panels for 12 years. For k=5, we can construct 
instruments across ASM panels for all years. We tried both approaches.   25
For example, the 1967 estimates imply that shifting 10% of power generation from coal 
to hydro involves a 3.6% reduction in cost per kWh. The estimates also imply that bigger 
utilities have lower supply costs in the 1960s, but the effects are small. 
Turning to our main focus, the moments of the customer purchase distribution are 
jointly significant at the 0.1% level in all years, strongly confirming the statistical 
significance of purchase quantity as a determinant of supply costs.  Table 6 and Figure 8 
report the estimated supply cost schedules. Figure 8 also shows a scatter plot of mean log 
customer purchases for each utility, 1g lq , against the sum of the corresponding fitted cost 
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⎛ =  and the utility’s regression residual. As 
seen in Figure 8 and Table 6, supply costs per kWh fall by a factor of 2 or 3 over the 
range of purchases spanned by the utilities in our sample. This pattern holds in all years 
from 1963 to 2000. In unreported results, we re-estimated the supply cost regressions by 
IV using the approach described above, and obtained essentially the same findings. These 
results provide strong evidence of powerful, cost-based reasons for large quantity 
discounts in electricity pricing to industrial customers. 
We also computed the average supply-cost elasticity with respect to customer 
purchase quantity for each year and compared it to the average price elasticity with 
respect to purchase quantity (Figure 6). The comparison yields two interesting results. 
First, the average cost elasticity is consistently somewhat larger in magnitude than the 
average price elasticity, indicating that (average) supply costs fall more rapidly with 
purchase quantity than (average) price per kWh. Second, longer term swings in the 
average cost elasticity closely mirror the swings in the average price elasticity in Figure   26
6. This time-series pattern reinforces the inference derived from the cross-sectional 
evidence that cost factors drive large quantity discounts in electricity pricing.   
7.   Evaluating the Pricing Structure 
7.1 Is Pricing Efficient on the Purchase Quantity Margin? 
Pricing efficiency requires that marginal prices for successive increments of 
electrical power equal marginal supply costs at all points on the customer purchase 
distribution. This is a demanding requirement in our context, because the range of 
purchases is enormous. We now test whether this condition holds in the data. Earlier 
empirical studies also consider retail pricing efficiency in the electric power industry. 
Examples include Meyer and Leland (1980), Hayashi, Sevier and Trapani (1985) and 
Nelson, Roberts and Tromp (1987). However, these studies evaluate pricing differences 
across classes of customers – residential, industrial and commercial – from the vantage 
point of efficiency, Ramsey pricing, and rate of return regulation. They do not consider 
pricing efficiency on the purchase quantity margin. Indeed, we are unaware of any 
previous study that tests marginal cost and Ramsey pricing conditions on the purchase 
quantity margin, even though the issue receives much attention in theoretical works.
25 
See Brown and Sibley (1986) and Wilson (1993) and references therein. Our empirical 
assessment of pricing on the purchase quantity margin complements the well-developed 
theoretical literature on the topic. 
For purposes of comparing the marginal curves, we first re-estimate the price-
quantity schedules by regressing price per unit (not logged) on a third-order polynomial 
in log customer purchases. We include utility fixed effects to isolate within-utility price 
                                                 
25 Peltzman (1971) considers electricity pricing on the purchase quantity margin, but he lacks the cost data 
needed for an assessment of pricing efficiency.   27
variation. In re-estimating the price schedules, we omit plants with annual purchases 
outside the range of mean log purchases in the utility-level data. These modifications to 
the specification and samples used in Sections 4 and 5 provide for an apples-to-apples 
comparison of the marginal cost and marginal price curves.  
Given a fitted price-quantity schedule, it is easy to calculate the corresponding 
marginal price schedule. Let  ( ) ( ) Tq q Pq = be the total electricity tariff paid by a plant 
that purchases q kWh, where  ( ) Pqis the average price per kWh. We compute the 
marginal price schedule as 
  () () ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () () (/) (/ 2 ) (/ 2 ) Mq Pq q Pq Pq εε ε ⎡ ⎤ =+ + − − ⎣ ⎦ (6) 
where  ˆ() Pqis the fitted value of the price-quantity schedule at q, andε  is a small positive 
number. We follow the same approach in calculating marginal cost schedules from 
estimated supply cost schedules of the type displayed in Figure 8.  
   Recall that each ASM panel is an independently drawn random sample. To 
exploit this sample design feature, we pool customer-level observations over year-pairs 
that straddle ASM panel changeovers before we construct the utility-level data. This 
pooling method yields more customer-level observations per utility and a larger number 
of usable utility-level observations, thereby improving estimation efficiency in the supply 
cost regressions. We estimate these regressions using the same specification and 
weighted least squares method as before except for the addition of a year control. 
  Figure 9 displays the marginal schedules for selected years, along with 
bootstrapped standard error bands for the marginal cost schedules. (Standard errors for 
marginal prices are extremely small, and we ignore them in the discussion that follows.) 
The marginal price and cost schedules are remarkably similar in both 1967 and 1973/74,   28
strongly confirming the central implication of pricing efficiency on the purchase quantity 
margin. After 1973/74, however, a gap opens between marginal cost and marginal price 
in the lower deciles of the purchases distribution. The gap is sizable, with marginal cost 
exceeding marginal price by 10% or more for smaller purchasers.  
  To construct a more powerful formal test for the null hypothesis of pricing 
efficiency, we now pool the data over several years. We evaluate pricing efficiency in the 
“early years” 1963, 1967, 1973 and 1974 and the “recent years” 1988, 1993, 1998 and 
1999. The early years predate the departures from pricing efficiency suggested by Figure 
9, and the recent years postdate them. We selected these particular years because they 
involve eight independently drawn random samples of manufacturing plants. In pooling 
the data over years, we introduce year controls that allow for marginal costs to shift over 
time in a manner that is uniform with respect to purchase quantity. 
Table 7 reports the pooled-sample estimates and bootstrapped standard errors for 
early and late years. The upper panel extends our previous pooling method for calculating 
utility-level statistics from customer-level observations. This method results in many 
customer-level observations per utility but only one observation per utility in the supply 
cost regression. Hence, this method exploits only between-utility variation to estimate the 
cost schedules.  The lower panel calculates utility-level statistics from customer-level 
data first and then pools over years. This method results in fewer customer-level 
observations per utility but up to four observations per utility in the supply cost 
regression. Under this method, we assume that utility-level error terms in the supply cost 
regression are uncorrelated over time.  This second method exploits between- and within-
utility variation to estimate the cost schedules.   29
  The two pooling methods yield a similar pattern of point estimates that shows 
sizable departures from pricing efficiency in the later years for smaller customers. 
Marginal prices are roughly 10% below marginal costs at the 20
th percentile of the 
purchase quantity distribution in the later years. The second pooling method also yields 
evidence against marginal cost pricing for smaller customers in the early years, but the 
deviation from pricing efficiency is much smaller, amounting to less than 5% of marginal 
cost. In line with Figure 9, Table 7 yields no evidence of departures from pricing 
efficiency in the middle and upper portions of the purchase quantity distribution.  
A potential issue with Figure 9 and Table 7 is that the test results may be affected 
by inaccuracies in the assignment of customers to utilities. To address this issue, we 
created a sample that restricts attention to utilities and customers with highly accurate 
assignments.  When a county is served by a single utility, we know the correct 
assignment of customer to utility from the EIA-861 files.  We also know the correct 
assignment with near certainty in those states with detailed GIS data on utility service 
territories.  We used the detailed GIS information available for certain states to estimate 
how the cruder information available in other states affects the probability of an accurate 
assignment.  Our method, detailed in Davis et al. (2007b), yields a probability of an 
accurate assignment for each customer and an estimated accuracy rate for each utility.    
In the full sample that underlies Table 7 and Figure 9, we estimate that 67% of 
customers are assigned to the correct utility.
26  To construct a restricted sample, we 
discarded customers with low probabilities of an accurate assignment and discarded 
                                                 
26 The estimated accuracy rate is calculated in a shipments-weighted manner. The actual accuracy rate is 
probably somewhat higher, because the 67% figure does not account for the hand-adjusted assignments that 
we made based on visual inspections of utility service territory maps in nine states.  The same point applies 
to the 88% accuracy rate for the restricted sample.   30
utilities with low accuracy rates.  (See Appendix A for details.)  The resulting limited 
sample has an estimated match accuracy rate of 88 percent.  The number of utility-level 
observations available for the Table 7 analysis using the limited sample is about 70% 
smaller than before for Panel A and about 45% smaller for Panel B. 
The restricted sample results are very similar to the full sample results, except that 
the smaller number of utility-level observations produces bigger standard errors.  There is 
no evidence in the restricted sample of departures from marginal cost pricing in the 
middle or upper parts of the purchase quantity distribution.  The point estimate for 
marginal cost minus marginal price at the 20
th percentile is somewhat larger in the limited 
sample, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference under the pooling 
method of Panel A.  The discrepancy between marginal price and marginal cost at the 
20
th percentile is statistically significant at the 10% level under the pooling method of 
Panel B.  In short, the restricted sample results are consistent with the full sample results, 
but the statistical evidence for departures from marginal cost pricing is weaker. 
7.2 Does Ramsey Pricing Play a Role? 
  Figure 9 and Table 7 provide no support for the standard Ramsey-pricing 
explanation of quantity discounts. According to this explanation, the markup of marginal 
price over marginal cost is positive, and it declines with the elasticity of demand. By all 
accounts, and consistent with our evidence in Section 5, demand is more price sensitive 
in the upper segments of the purchases distribution. Hence, the standard Ramsey-pricing 
perspective predicts that marginal price exceeds marginal cost, and that the markup 
shrinks with purchase level. The pattern we have seen is more nearly the opposite.   31
That the data do not conform perfectly to Ramsey pricing is no surprise. 
However, we are struck by the utter failure of the standard Ramsey-pricing view to 
account for any portion of the large quantity discounts in electricity pricing. Evidently, 
cost differences and not markup differences are the predominant reason for quantity 
discounts. When the pricing structure deviates from efficiency, it does so in the opposite 
direction from the prediction of the standard Ramsey-pricing view. 
It is worth remarking, however, that the data can be reconciled with Ramsey 
pricing under the unusual premise that marginal cost pricing raises too much revenue; i.e., 
that efficient pricing raises more revenue than required to cover costs and a normal return 
on equity. In this circumstance, Ramsey-pricing logic implies that the second-best pricing 
structure involves bigger markdowns of marginal prices relative to marginal costs in the 
less elastic portion of the purchases distribution. That is essentially the marginal pricing 
structure that emerges after 1973. The premise that yields this rationalization is greatly at 
odds with the traditional view that electric utilities operate with declining costs. However, 
it resonates with evidence that changes in the regulatory environment over the course of 
the 1970s led to tighter capacity constraints and higher costs of expanding capacity.  
8. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we documented tremendous dispersion in the price per kWh that 
manufacturers pay for electricity.  Spatial price differentials and quantity discounts 
account for all but a small fraction of the dispersion in prices.  We also developed and 
implemented a new method for estimating how supply costs vary with customer purchase 
quantity. The estimation reveals that annual supply costs per kWh fall by more than half   32
in moving from smaller to bigger purchasers, providing a clear cost-based rationale for 
quantity discounts. 
We applied our estimated cost and price schedules to test for pricing efficiency on the 
annual purchase quantity margin and to evaluate a traditional Ramsey-pricing 
interpretation of quantity discounts.   Somewhat to our surprise, the data are remarkably 
consistent with marginal cost pricing.  The exception is pricing to smaller manufacturing 
customers after the mid 1970s.  The marginal cost of incremental purchases for these 
customers exceeds the marginal price by more than 10% in the 1980s and 1990s.  This 
deviation from marginal cost pricing is inconsistent with a standard Ramsey-pricing 
story, which predicts that marginal cost lies below marginal price, and more so for 
smaller purchasers.  Our tests for marginal cost pricing and Ramsey pricing on the 
purchase quantity margin complement a well-developed theoretical literature on the 
topic. 
What caused the departure from pricing efficiency for smaller customers after the mid 
1970s? An answer to that question is beyond the scope of this paper, but we suggest two 
avenues for future investigation. First, sizable deviations from marginal cost pricing 
began to emerge at the same time as real electricity prices began to rise (Figure 2). As 
mentioned in Section 3, the rise in real electricity prices from 1973 to 1983 reversed a 
decades-long trend. Perhaps utility companies or their regulators sought to insulate 
smaller industrial customers from the full impact of rising energy costs. A difficulty with 
this story is its failure to explain the persistence of deviations from marginal cost pricing 
after real electricity prices resumed a downward trend.  Another difficulty is that, under 
two-part tariffs, subsidies need not involve departures from marginal cost pricing.    33
  Second, during the 1970s public utility commissions began to focus greater effort 
on the review and design of electricity tariff schedules, as discussed by Cudahy and 
Malko (1976) in their treatment of the landmark Madison Gas and Electric case. The 
Madison case, initiated in 1972, stimulated similar reviews in other states. “By 1977, 12 
state commissions had held generic hearings on retail electric rate structure reform.” 
(Joskow, 1979, page 794) Ironically, these moves toward more aggressive intervention in 
rate design were often promoted as efforts to implement marginal-cost pricing principles. 
Our evidence shows that greater involvement in the design of rate structures by public 
utility commissions coincided with significant steps away from efficient pricing on the 
margin we measure.  A careful study of whether intervention by public utility 
commissions caused the deviations from efficient pricing merits investigation. 
Our results also identify some noteworthy aspects of spatial price differentials.  
Spatial price dispersion declined sharply from the late 1960s to the late 1980s for the 
largest purchasers, but it rose over time in the lower half of the purchases distribution 
(Figure 3). The expansion of wholesale power markets in the 1990s had no apparent 
effect on spatial price dispersion at the retail level for manufacturing customers.  It strikes 
us as something of a puzzle that rapid expansion of wholesale power markets in the 
1990s had so little impact on spatial price dispersion at the retail level.  
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Appendix A.  Assigning Manufacturing Plants to Electric Utilities 
This appendix provides an overview of our methods for assigning manufacturing 
plants to electric utilities.  See Davis et al. (2007b) for a more detailed discussion and an 
evaluation of assignment accuracy. 
The EIA-861 data do not determine a unique, unambiguous assignment in 
counties served by more than one electric utility.
27 We addressed this issue using several 
approaches, depending on available information.  First, we created a “best-match” utility 
indicator for each county. Given a list of utilities with industrial customers in the county, 
the indicator identifies the utility with the largest statewide revenues from sales to 
industrial customers. Based on each manufacturing plant’s county of operation, our 
default assignment method (in the absence of better information described below) is to 
assign the plant to the utility selected by the best-match indicator. We introduce a 
separate utility code for each state in which a utility operates, because state laws and 
state-level public utility commissions govern rate setting.  
Second, we use Geographic Information System (GIS) maps of electric utility 
service areas for Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin.
28 These six 
states account for 13.4% of plants, 14.2% of employment, 14.8% of payroll, 17.3% of 
electricity purchases, 15.3% of electricity expenditures and 15.1% of shipments in the 
PQEM. We use street address to assign latitude and longitude to manufacturing plants 
and then overlay the GIS service area map to determine the electric utility that serves the 
                                                 
27 459 counties are served by a single utility, 776 are served by 2 utilities, 791 are served by 3 utilities, 535 
are served by 4 utilities, 441 are served by 5-7 utilities, and the remaining 29 counties are served by 8-12 
utilities. To the best of our knowledge, data on the list of counties served by each electric utility are not 
available prior to 1999. Hence, we apply each utility’s county list for 2000 to all years.  
28 The Minnesota GIS map we obtained is an unofficial version.   35
plant.  Using this approach, we can construct highly accurate matches for most plants in 
states with GIS maps of utility service areas.  
Third, for California, New York and Rhode Island, we obtained a list of utilities 
that operate in each zip code. These three states account for 18.2% of plants, 16.6% of 
employment, 17.5% of payroll, 9.8% of electricity purchases, 13.3% of electricity 
expenditures and 14.7% of shipments in the PQEM.  Because zip codes cover much 
smaller areas than counties, the zip code data enables us to construct a unique match in 
most cases.  When more than one utility serves a given zip code, we assigned plants 
based on the same type of “best match” approach as described above for counties.   
Fourth, we adjusted our county-based assignments in some cases based on visual 
inspections of maps showing utility service territories in Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wyoming. These states 
account for 23.3% of plants, 23.7% of employment, 24.1% of payroll, 21.4% of 
electricity purchases, 23.2% of electricity expenditures and 24.3% of shipments in the 
PQEM. We inspected the utility service territories for each county, and if one utility 
clearly covers most of the county, we assign that utility to all plants in the county. If the 
county is not covered primarily by a single utility, we retained the county-based utility 
match.   
As noted in the main text, we exploit publicly available information on the identity of 
plants that purchase electricity directly from the six largest public power authorities. In 
all other cases, our assignment procedures rely on the assumption that a plant’s location 
determines its electricity supplier.  This assumption works for the period of time covered 
by our data, because electric utilities were monopolies at the retail distribution level.   36
According to Joskow (2005), the “first retail competition programs began operating in 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and California in early 1998 and spread to about a dozen 
states by the end of 2000.”  These developments on the retail side occur at the very end of 
the period covered by our data. 37 
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Table 1.  Selected Characteristics of the PQEM Database 
Years covered  1963, 1967, 1972-2000 
Number of plant-level observations per year  48,164 to 72,128 
Total number of annual plant-level observations
a 1,816,720 
Number of counties with manufacturing plants  3,031 
Number of 4-digit SIC industries (1972 / 1987)
b  447 / 458 
Number of best-match utilities
c 697 
Mean annual electricity purchases, Gigawatt hours (GWh)
d  99.7        (860.4) 
Standard deviation of annual electricity purchases (GWh)
d  334.0   (2,400.0) 
Quantiles of Annual Electricity Purchases, Gigawatt-hours
e   
Weighting Method  1 5 10 25 50  75 90  95  99 
Shipments .07  .30  .70  3.22  16.4 89.2 267  444  1,500 
Purchases .20  1.08  2.84 13.58 85.9 452  2,100 4,185  14,241 
Weighting Method  Quantiles of Electricity Costs as a Percent of Total Labor Costs
e 
Shipments  0.4 1.1  1.5  2.5  4.7 10.2 25.7  46.3  197.2 
Purchases  1.1  2.1 3.0  6.1 17.2 61.7 201.0 305.3  3,461 
Notes: 
a The initial sample contains 1,945,813 records. We drop 107 records because of invalid 
geography codes and 128,058 (6.6%) because of missing values for electricity price, total 
employment, value added or shipments.  We also trim the bottom 0.05% of the electricity price 
distribution in each year (928 observations over all years). 
b We use 1972 SIC codes in 1963, 1967, and 1972-1986 and 1987 SIC codes in 1987-2000.  See 
Davis et al. (2007) for additional information. 
c There are 684 best-match utilities not counting public power authorities: Tennessee Valley 
Authority, Bonneville Power Administration, New York Power Authority, Santee Cooper, Grand 
River Dam Authority, and the Colorado River Commission of Nevada. By construction, a best-
match utility does not cross state lines. 
d Weighted by shipments (electricity purchases). 
e For disclosure reasons, the quantiles shown above are averages of plant-level observations in 
three quantiles, the quantile shown and the two surrounding quantiles (e.g., quantile 50 as shown 
is the average of observations in quantiles 49, 50, and 51).   40
Table 2.  The Shipments-Weighted Distribution of Log Electricity Prices Paid by U.S. 
Manufacturing Plants, Dispersion and Variance Decompositions 
   1963 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987  1992  1997 2000
  Overall Standard Deviation  .409 .468 .429 .369 .359 .347 .373 .388 .360 
Price Dispersion Between Industries 
4-Digit SIC Industries (447/458)
+                         
Between Variance as % of Total  36.6  36.3  28.0  20.6  19.4  23.1  26.4  25.1  23.8 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .248 .282 .227 .167 .158 .167 .192 .194 .175 
Price Dispersion Between Geographic Areas 
NERC Regions (12)                            
Between Variance as % of Total  9.0  9.7  12.7  13.2  17.9  15.1  22.2  20.9  21.3 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .123 .146 .153 .134 .152 .135 .175 .177 .166 
States (51)                            
Between Variance as % of Total  11.9  13.6  17.3  34.8  46.5  36.7  42.7  39.4  38.0 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .141 .173 .179 .218 .245 .210 .243 .244 .222 
Utilities (697)                             
Between Variance as % of Total  20.4  22.1  23.5  44.3  58.3  45.7  52.9  48.9  47.3 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .185 .220 .208 .246 .274 .234 .271 .272 .247 
Counties (3,031)                            
Between Variance as % of Total  31.4  32.0  32.2  53.0  67.2  54.3  61.6  57.6  56.3 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .230 .265 .244 .269 .294 .256 .292 .295 .270 
Price Dispersion Between Groups Defined by Annual Electricity Purchases 
Purchase Deciles (10)                            
Between Variance as % of Total  57.2  54.2  33.2  16.4  19.3  26.2  29.0  30.6  25.6 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .310 .345 .247 .150 .158 .177 .201 .215 .182 
Purchase Centiles (100)                            
Between Variance as % of Total  61.1  57.2  35.8  18.6  21.6  28.7  31.9  32.7  29.0 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .320 .354 .257 .159 .167 .186 .210 .222 .194 
Price Dispersion Between Groups Defined by Utility and Purchase Level 
Utility x Purchase Decile (4,252) 
Between Variance as % of Total  74.8  70.4  56.6  60.9  74.0  67.6  75.4  72.5  70.3 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .354 .393 .323 .288 .309 .285 .324 .331 .302 
Utility x Purchase Centile (32,142) 
Between Variance as % of Total  84.1  79.6  67.7  71.5  83.1  78.5  85.1  83.8  81.9 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .375 .418 .353 .312 .327 .307 .344 .356 .325 
+ Years prior to 1987 are classified using the 1977 SIC system (447 4-digit industries). 
Years 1987 and later are classified using the 1987 SIC system (458 4-digit industries).   
Source: Authors’ calculations on PQEM data.   41
Table 3.  The Purchases-Weighted Distribution of Log Electricity Prices Paid by U.S. 
Manufacturing Plants, Dispersion and Variance Decompositions 
   1963 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987  1992  1997 2000
  Overall Standard Deviation  .524 .552 .478 .433 .439 .429 .477 .437 .383 
Price Dispersion Between Industries 
4-Digit SIC Industries (447/458)
+                         
Between Variance as % of Total  71.3  61.4  48.8  40.9  37.9  46.8  59.0  44.5  37.5 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .443 .432 .334 .277 .270 .293 .366 .292 .234 
Price Dispersion Between Geographic Areas 
NERC Regions (12)                            
Between Variance as % of Total  22.1  18.9  19.5  9.2  10.2  8.4  10.3  9.8  13.5 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .247 .240 .211 .132 .140 .124 .153 .137 .141 
States (51)                            
Between Variance as % of Total  43.8  40.5  37.5  40.0  45.7  38.3  39.3  37.5  39.5 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .347 .351 .293 .274 .297 .265 .299 .268 .240 
Utilities (697)                             
Between Variance as % of Total  67.2  58.4  52.3  60.0  65.2  56.8  59.1  55.0  52.7 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .430 .422 .346 .335 .354 .323 .366 .324 .278 
Counties (3,031)                            
Between Variance as % of Total  77.9  69.6  64.9  73.5  78.6  74.9  77.5  69.9  65.4 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .462 .460 .385 .371 .389 .371 .419 .365 .310 
Price Dispersion Between Groups Defined by Annual Electricity Purchases 
Purchase Deciles (10)                            
Between Variance as % of Total  62.8  56.3  36.2  27.4  24.7  38.0  49.5  41.3  38.1 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .415 .414 .288 .227 .218 .264 .335 .281 .236 
Purchase Centiles (100)                            
Between Variance as % of Total  74.7  65.5  41.5  33.8  31.8  45.0  60.8  45.9  43.4 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .453 .446 .308 .252 .247 .288 .372 .296 .252 
Price Dispersion Between Groups Defined by Utility and Purchase Level 
Utility x Purchase Decile (4,252) 
Between Variance as % of Total  89.7  83.2  71.2  74.8  79.2  78.3  82.9  76.2  74.3 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .496 .503 .404 .374 .391 .379 .434 .382 .330 
Utility x Purchase Centile (32,142) 
Between Variance as % of Total  94.7  91.1  81.6  84.5  88.4  88.3  91.7  87.5  86.3 
Between  Standard  Deviation  .510 .527 .432 .398 .413 .403 .456 .409 .356 
+ Years prior to 1987 are classified using the 1977 SIC system (447 4-digit industries). 
Years 1987 and later are classified using the 1987 SIC system (458 4-digit industries).   
Source: Authors’ calculations on PQEM data.   42





























General Service, GN-96  6.56¢  None  None  No    $6.85  Less than 90 MWh per year 
Medium General Service, 
GS-96 
2.60¢  $11.85  $11.85  No  $16.15  Greater than 90 MWh and less 
than 1,080 MWh per year 
Large General Service, 
GL-96 (Optional 
provision for interruptible 
power) 
2.32¢ $13.20 
($8.57 for  
interruptible 
portion) 
$3,960 Yes,  $0.50 
per kW 
$24.00  Greater than 1,080 MWh  per 
year, and delivery points near 
transmission line 
General Service Time of 
Use, GT-96 
2.32¢ $13.20  peak, 
$3.87 off-peak 
  No  $24.00  Greater than 90 MWh per year 
Large Power and Light, 
L-96 (Requires 5-year 
contract with high floor 
on demand charges)  
2.19¢ $10.76   
(extra $6.00 per kW 
in excess of 
contract level) 
$10,760 





$1,200  Demand greater than 1,000 kW 
and delivery points near 
transmission lines; minimum 5-
year commitment. 
Optional Riders to Large Power and Light Schedule 
Curtailable Supplemental 
Power, L-97 
Different energy charges and a discount of 72% on demand charges for supplemental power that is subject 
to temporary or permanent curtailment or interruption with six months notice. 
Interruptible Power, L-02-I  Discount of 36% on demand charges for power subject to curtailment or interruption on short notice (2.5 
hours); limitations on frequency and duration of curtailments and interruptions; one-year advance notice 
required by customer to reduce interruptible portion of demand. 
Off-Peak Service, L-96-OP  Discount of 80% on demand charges for off-peak power in excess of contracted levels for Firm, 
Supplemental and Interruptible Demands; subject to curtailment or interruption on short notice. 
Economy Power, L-02-EP  Discounted energy charges offered, at Santee Cooper’s sole discretion, to customers with Contract 
Demand greater than 2,000 kW. Available on short notice during specified clock hours. 
Standby Power, L-96-SB  Available at Santee Cooper’s discretion to customers with alternative non-emergency power sources. 
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Notes: 
1.  The charges listed above exclude South Carolina Sales Tax and other taxes and fees levied by governmental authorities.  
2.  Electricity is metered and billed separately for each delivery point and voltage level, so that the Monthly Customer Charge and 
Minimum Monthly Demand Charge apply per delivery point and voltage level. 
3.  All service types are subject to a Fuel Adjustment Clause (FAC-96) whereby the energy charge per kWh is adjusted by an additive 
factor that depends on Santee Cooper’s fuel costs in the preceding three months, an allowance for its capital improvements and 
distribution losses, and other considerations. The energy charge adjustment per kWh is similar for all service types, but the 
adjustment is less sensitive to capital improvements and distribution losses under the Large Power and Light schedule. Under all 
schedules, standard “firm-requirements” service is also subject to a Demand Sales Adjustment Clause (DSC-96) that credits Santee 
Cooper customers with specified shares of its demand-related and capacity-related revenues. The Demand Sales Adjustment can be 
positive or negative. It is applied as a proportional adjustment to the monthly demand charge under the Large Power and Light 
schedule and as a proportional adjustment to the monthly energy charge under the General Service schedules. 
4.  The kW level used to calculate the Monthly Demand Charge can be greater than “Measured Demand” during the billing period, 
defined as “the maximum 30-minute integrated kW demand recorded by suitable measuring device during each billing period.” For 
example, the Medium General Service schedule states that the “monthly Billing Demand shall be the greater of (i) the Measured 
Demand for the current billing period or (ii) fifty percent (50%) of the greatest Firm Billing Demand computed for the preceding 
eleven months.” The Large General Service schedule specifies a 70% figure. 
5.  The discounted Demand Charge under the General Service Time-of-Use Schedule applies to the difference between the customer’s 
Off-Peak Measured Demand and the customer’s On-Peak Measured Demand. 
6.  The transformer discount requires that the customer take delivery at available transmission voltage (69kV or greater).  
7.  Customers that opt for curtailable or interruptible power forfeit all discounts previously received during the calendar year for such 
power in the event they fail to meet a request for power curtailment or interruption. In addition, future discounts for curtailable and 
interruptible power can be withdrawn.  
8.  Under the Large Power and Light schedule, the customer must commit to a Firm Contract Demand level for a five-year period. The 
Firm Contract Level places a floor on the demand level used to compute the Monthly Demand Charge. Lower minimum monthly 
demand charges are available under certain conditions. The Large Light and Power Schedule also includes an Excess Demand 
Charge of $6.00 per kW for Measured Demand in excess of the Firm Contract Demand, a charge of $0.44 per kVAr of Excess 
Reactive Demand, and a Monthly Facilities Charge equal to 1.4% of the original installed cost of any facilities that Santee Cooper 
provides in addition to the facilities it normally provides to its customers.  
Source: Santee Cooper tariff schedules for commercial and industrial customers at http://www.santeecooper.com/ (20 July 2004).    44
Table 5. Regression Results for Electricity Supply Costs, Selected Years 
Dependent Variable: Purchase-weighted mean price per kWh for the utility’s 
manufacturing customers  
                  1967  1973  1978  2000 
Public Ownership           27**  19*  13  11 
                  (9)  (9)  (13)  (11) 
Private Ownership       34**  19**  12**  8* 
                  (4)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
Fraction of Utility Total Revenue from Industrial Customers  5  -22*  -33**  -5 
                  (9)  (9)  (12)  (10) 
Share of Power From Hydro   -36**  -47**  -57**  17* 
                  (5)  (5)  (6)  (8) 
Share of Power From Nuclear   408**  50**  13  46** 
                  (81)  (13)  (7)  (8) 
Share of Power From Oil and Natural Gas    -4  -6  7  43** 
                  (3) (4) (5) (8) 
Adjusted  R-Square  0.76 0.65 0.61 0.63 
Test: Utility Size Measures = 0  0.00  0.44  0.30  0.60 
Test: Customer Size Measures = 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Test: Ownership Measures =  0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 
N                 253 272 298 290 
*  p<0.05,  **  p<0.01      
Notes: 
1.  Regressions are on utility-level data by weighted least squares. Weights are 
proportional to the square root of the number of customer observations used to 
calculate the utility-level statistics. The sample is limited to utilities for which 
there are at least 8 customer-level observations. The dependent variable is 
normalized so that the purchase-weighted mean price over utilities equals 100.    
2.  In addition to the variables shown in the table, the regression also includes the 
first three uncentered moments of the utility’s log customer size distribution and a 
quadratic polynomial in the log of the utility’s electricity sales to industrial 
customers.  
3.  The ownership variables and the fraction of total revenue from industrial 
customers are from the 2000 EIA-861 file. Public and private ownership variables 
are dummy variables, and the omitted category is cooperative and municipal 
ownership. Fuel share variables are state-level data from the State Energy Data 
2000 files.  Both coal and “other” (includes geothermal, wind, wood and waste, 
photovoltaic, and solar) are omitted since “other” is always very small. Moments 
of the customer size distribution are constructed from the PQEM. 
Source: Authors’ calculations on data from the PQEM, EIA-861 files, and State Energy 
Data 2000.   45
Table 6. Estimated Electricity Supply-Cost Schedules as a Function of Customer 
Purchase Quantity, Selected Years 
 





Distribution 1967 1973 1978  2000 
0.53 10  8.09  6.32  9.54  10.37 
2.43 25  5.72  4.90  7.44  7.43 
13.1 50  4.23  3.87  6.07  5.41 
73.9 75  3.45  3.22  5.34  4.30 
229 90  3.09  2.91  5.04  3.90 
422 95  2.88  2.75  4.89  3.74 
1,130 99  2.43  2.48  4.60  3.50 
 
Notes: 
1.  The supply-cost schedules are derived from the regressions reported in Table 5 
and described in Section 6.1. The schedules are evaluated at sample mean values 
of the other regression covariates. 
2.  The percentiles of the purchases distribution are the simple average of the 
percentiles of the shipments-weighted purchase distribution in 1967, 1973, 1978, 
and 2000. 
3.  We do not report supply costs for the bottom tail of the purchases distribution, 
because small purchase values are outside the range we used to fit the utility-level 
regressions in Table 5. 
Source: Authors’ calculations on PQEM data.   46
Table 7.  Tests of Pricing Efficiency with Alternative Pooling Methods 
 
A. Customer-Level Data Pooled over Years before Calculating Utility-Level Statistics 
  
Marginal Price 
(1996 ¢ / kWh) 
Marginal Cost 
(1996 ¢ / kWh)
Standard  
Error of  
Marginal Cost 
(1996 ¢ / kWh) 
Difference:  
MP - MC  
(1996 ¢ / kWh) 
1963, 1967, 1973, 1974  N = 432 
  20th  4.62  4.89  0.16  -0.27 
  50th  3.66  3.78  0.16  -0.12 
  80th  3.20  3.02  0.16  0.18 
1988, 1993, 1998, 1999  N = 495 
  20
th 6.25  7.01  0.35  -0.76 
  50
th 5.06  5.13  0.35  -0.07 
  80
th 4.20  3.93  0.35  0.27 
 
B. Utility-Level Statistics Calculated from Customer-Level Data before Pooling 
  
Marginal Price 
(1996 ¢ / kWh) 
Marginal Cost 
(1996 ¢ / kWh)
Standard  
Error of Marginal 
Cost  
(1996 ¢ / kWh) 
Difference:  
MP - MC  
(1996 ¢ / kWh) 
1963, 1967, 1973, 1974  N = 1,038 
  20
th 4.67  4.84  0.09  -0.17 
  50
th 3.68  3.72  0.09  -0.04 
  80
th 3.19  3.17  0.09  0.02 
1988, 1993, 1998, 1999  N = 1,180 
  20
th 6.29  6.88  0.23  -0.59 
  50
th 5.09  4.93  0.23  0.17 
  80
th 4.26  4.25  0.22  0.01 
 
Notes:  See text for a description of the underlying specifications and estimation methods.    47
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations on PQEM data.  
Figure 1.  Electricity Price Dispersion Among U.S. Manufacturing Plants, 1963-2000 
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Source:  Energy Information Administration for Residential, Commercial and 
Industrial series; authors’ calculations on PQEM data for Manufacturing. 
Figure 2.  Real Electricity Prices by End-Use Sector, 1960-2000 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations on PQEM data with part-year observations 
excluded. 
Note:  The between-county standard deviations are calculated in a purchase-
weighted manner using residuals from annual customer-level regressions 
of log price on a fifth-order polynomial in log purchases. 
Figure 3.  Spatial Price Dispersion by Selected Deciles of the Purchases Distribution, 
1963-2000   50
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations on shipments-weighted PQEM data with part-year 
observations excluded. 






   51
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations on PQEM data with part-year observations 
excluded. 








th percentiles of the shipments-weighted distribution of annual 
purchases for 1967, 1973, 1978, and 2000.  
Figure 5.  Log Electricity Price Fit to Fifth-Order Polynomials in Log Purchases, 
Selected Years 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations on PQEM data with part-year observations 
excluded. 
Note:  Elasticity values are calculated from shipments-weighted regressions of the 
log price on a fifth-order polynomial in log purchases. 
Figure 6.  Average Elasticity of Price with Respect to Purchase Quantity, 1963-2000 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations on PQEM data and Santee Cooper tariff schedules. 
Notes:  The regression fit on the PQEM data controls for utility fixed effects. Vertical 








percentiles of the shipments-weighted distribution of annual purchases for 
1967, 1973, 1978, and 2000.  
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Source:  Authors’ calculations on PQEM data with part-year observations excluded. 
Notes:  Each curve shows the fitted relationship between supply costs per kWh and annual customer purchases, evaluated at 
sample means of other covariates in the regression. The vertical coordinate for each plotted point is the sum of the 
fitted supply cost and the regression residual for a particular utility in the sample, as described in the text.  
Figure 8.  Electricity Supply Costs per kWh as a Function of Annual Customer Purchase Level, Selected Years   55
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations on PQEM data with part-year observations excluded. 







th percentiles of the shipments-weighted 
distribution of annual purchases for 1967, 1973, 1978, and 2000. Dashed curves show bootstrapped (unit) standard error 
bands. 
Figure 9.  Marginal Cost and Marginal Price Schedules Compared, Selected Years 